




MONEY AND THE EURO:
ON THE SIZE OF THE EFFECT
HANS-WERNER SINN *
AND FRANK WESTERMANN**
Since the announcement and the consummation of
the marriage between the D-mark and the euro,
the D-mark has lost a considerable part of its
value, and during the same time, the share of
D-mark currency in circulation in the total euro-11
monetary base (currency in circulation and banks’
central bank deposits) has declined markedly (see
Figures 1 and 2).In our opinion,these two facts are
related, having to do with the D-mark stocks in
Eastern Europe and Turkey and with the black
money of the euro-11 countries.This paper discuss-
es the magnitudes of the effects involved and their
likely implications for the exchange value of the
euro.1
According to Bundesbank estimates, one third of
D-mark currency circulated outside Germany in
1995.2 In today’s circumstances this amounts to
about k46 billion.Most of the D-marks were held
in east and southeast Europe, where the countries
freed from the Communist yoke were eager to
exchange their own currencies against hard D-
mark, and in Turkey in whose inflation-prone lira
the “guest workers“ had no confidence. Part of
the money has returned to Germany in recent
years as confidence in these countries’ own cur-
rencies has grown and interest of the currency
holders in the dying D-mark has waned. Many
people did not know what to expect and many still
do not know. Some have heard that the euro will
replace the D-mark. But they do not know the
exchange rate, do not know who will do the
exchanging, and fear to be cheated by excessive
commissions. To be sure, earlier currency conver-
sions in their own countries always went hand in
hand with considerable exchange losses. That is
why they switch to the dollar, the Swiss franc or
back into their own currencies, and that is one of
the reasons why the D-mark and the euro are
weak.
The returned D-mark stocks arrived back at the
Bundesbank via the international banking system.
The Bundesbank purchased these stocks because
otherwise interest rates would have fallen. This
explains the dramatic decline of the D-mark cur-
rency stock as a share of euro-11 money supply as
shown in Figure 2.
This kind of passive intervention by the
Bundesbank prevented part of the depreciation
which might otherwise have occurred, but only
part. By purchasing the returning D-mark stocks,
German treasury bills flowed back to the private
sector, distorting investors’ international asset
portfolios. Investors reacted by moving to foreign
assets.This kept the exchange rate of the euro suf-
ficiently low to make sure that
the increase in German trea-
sury bills was absorbed by
international portfolios.
The decline of the euro did not
require foreign currency hold-
ers to have moved directly into
dollars. It was reinforced, how-
ever, to the extent to which the
declining demand for D-mark
was matched by an additional
demand for dollars, for this put
either direct or indirect addi-
tional downward pressure on
the euro. Direct pressure is cre-
ated when the Federal Reserve
EEE
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1 See Sinn and Westermann (2001) for a formal discussion of the
problem.
2 Seitz (1995).does not increase the money supply despite the
additional demand for dollars. Indirect pressure is
created if the Fed does provide the additional dol-
lars demanded in order to stabilise interest rates
and sells them to the banks for treasury bills. The
increasing scarcity of American treasury bills in
investors’ international portfolios results in a rising
dollar and thus in a further depreciation of the
euro.
The appreciation of the D-mark after the fall of the
Iron Curtain, from 1989 to 1995, may be explained
by a similar mechanism.3 At the time, the German
currency was sucked in by east European countries
whose monetary systems inspired little confidence
during the transition crisis. The Bundesbank, which
kept wondering why the money supply exceeded the
set target range, was forced to increase the money
stock in order to keep interest rates from rising to
exorbitant levels. The run on the D-mark was so
strong that it created upward pressure on the
D-mark which led to the breakdown of the EMS in
late 1992 and a dramatic depreciation against the
D-mark of most other currencies. This effect is not
covered by Figure 2 which only shows the price of
D-mark in terms of dollars.
Our theory predicts generally a positive correla-
tion of the foreign exchange value of a currency
and the amount of this currency in circulation if
the central bank targets the interest rate rather
than the money supply. We tested for this rela-
tionship and found the correlation to be highly
significant and robust.The currency crisis of 1992
with the ensuing D-mark appreciation and the
recent depreciation of the D-mark or the euro,
respectively, can be explained with the same
approach.
It is remarkable that the turn-
around in the demand for D-
mark occurred in 1996. This
may be due to the fact that the
announcement of the Dublin
summit eliminated last doubts
about the introduction of the
euro and thus the demise of the
D-mark. The abandonment of
the D-mark started with the
then emerging decisions and became stronger in
later years when more and more market agents
became aware of the political developments. The
introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999 was
only one link in a chain of events.
The uncertainty of foreign currency holders creat-
ed by the demise of the D-mark is a fact support-
ed by a great number of individual reports in the
media and can no longer be denied. Un-
fortunately the Bundesbank does not have any
exact statistics about the origin of the returning
D-marks, but that the return flows are huge is an
undeniable fact, and there is strong evidence that
a considerable part originates in eastern Europe.
The Ifo Institute published early on this.4 At the
beginning of 2001 the Ifo Institute also conducted
a survey of 70 economic experts working in east-
ern Europe.A majority of the respondents report-
ed about an increased uncertainty of the people in
connection with the introduction of the euro and
the modalities of the exchange as well as about a
rising interest in other currencies.The Polish gov-
ernment warned its citizens against continuing to
hold D-mark and recommended an exchange into
sloty, but many people seem to be moving from
the D-mark to other currencies than the sloty.
Secret services report massive exchange transac-
tions in Yugoslavia from the D-mark to the dol-
lar.5 Bundesbank President Welteke confirms the
problem when carefully phrasing during a press
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mous demand for capital following reuni-
fication (Sinn 1999). According to the
present state of knowledge, however, it
was money demand rather than capital
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4 See articles by Hans-Werner Sinn in Handelsblatt (6 Nov. 2000),
Financial Times (4 April 2001), and Süddeutsche Zeitung (6 April
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tioned (Poland, Russia, Turkey and the successor
states of the former Yugoslavia) there exists a cer-
tain uncertainty, according to our knowledge,
about what will happen to the stocks of D-mark
when the euro notes and coins arrive on 1 January
2002“.
An extensive survey which the Austrian Central
Bank has conducted over several years in
Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia, confirms meanwhile that the
decline of the share of D-mark in circulation in
the total euro-11 money supply can be explained
by the D-mark currency returning from abroad
and that there was, in addition, a substitution of
dollars for D-marks until the end of 2000.
Surprisingly, the study revealed that as late as
May 2001 no less than 41% of the holders of
D-mark planned to exchange their stocks not into
euro but into other currencies.The decline of the
D-mark share in euro-11 money supply from 1997
to 2000, shown in Figure 2, corresponds to about
k13 billion.7 If this amount is deducted from the
D-mark stock of k46 billion which, according to
the Bundesbank, was held abroad, then at the
beginning of 2001 about k33 billion of D-mark
should have existed in eastern Europe. 41% of
this sum amounts to about k14 billion.This is the
size of the D-mark currency stock which, accord-
ing to the findings of the Austrian Central Bank
and our own calculations, can be expected to be
exchanged for dollars in the period from May
2001 to February 2002, when the physical conver-
sion will be completed.8
The abandonment of the D-mark by the east
Europeans and Turks is not the only reason for
the euro weakness, however. Firstly, in eastern
Europe other European currencies are also held
like the schilling,the lira or the finmark.Secondly,
there are considerable stocks of black money,
which may amount to at least another k50 billion
for the euro-11 countries.9 The flight out of black
money also contributes to euro weakness. Those
who hold black money will hardly go to the bank
teller in January and February 2002, show their
identity card and answer the questions of the
bank officer who is obliged to ask them because
of money laundering laws. They must get rid of
the money before then, and exchanging it directly
for Swiss francs, British pounds or US dollars is
best. In contrast to the eastern-Europe effect this
effect will concern all European currencies and
therefore does not show up in a shift of the share
of D-mark notes and coins in the total euro-11
money stock.
Unfortunately we lack the data for directly esti-
mating the joint eastern-Europe and black-money
effect on all euro-11 countries. What we can esti-
mate is the sum of the eastern-Europe effect and
the black-money effect on the D-mark. Toward
this end we estimated German money demand for
the period 1966 to 2000 with the usual variables,
i.e.money market interest rate,
gross national product, and
time and determined the resid-
uals, i.e. the deviations from
trend. The result is shown in
Figure 3.The residuals seem to
follow about the same pattern
as in Figure 2 and fall below
the two-sigma range which can
Figure 3
7 In order of magnitude,this number corresponds to the findings by
Stix (2001).His Table 1 shows that in the countries under consider-
ation the share of D-mark currency circulating there in total
German money supply declined from 2.01% to 1.69% from 1997 to
1999, corresponding to a decline of D-mark currency abroad of
16% in two years or about 23% in three years. Taking this figure
which was determined on the basis of a limited number of east
European countries and relating it to the total D-mark stock out-
side Germany of k46 billion (Seitz 1995),yields an absolute decline
of D-mark currency stock of around k11 billion in the years 1997
to 2000.The insignificant difference of k2 billion may be due to the
countries surveyed by Stix not being completely representative of
total D-mark stocks held abroad.
8 From June 2000 to June 2001 the stock
of circulating D-marks declined by
k9 billion in absolute terms, and from
January to June 2001, it declined by near-
ly  k5 billion. The corresponding devia-
tions from the growth trend which matter
more are even larger.
9 Schneider and Ernste (2000).be considered – with 95% confidence – as an
anomalous development.10
The sharp decline of the money supply from the
first quarter 1997 to the last quarter of 2000 corre-
sponded to an absolute decrease of the D-mark
money demand against the trend in the amount of
k27 billion. This is probably the joint effect of
exchanged black money and returning currency
from eastern Europe and Turkey.
Extrapolating this amount to all euro-11 countries
is difficult because the eastern-Europe effect is
unlikely to be distributed evenly among all curren-
cies. The D-mark accounted for a share of 41% in
total euro-11 money supply,as shown in Figure 1.If
the eastern-Europe effect and the black-money
effect were distributed evenly, the total effect on
the euro-11 countries’ currency in circulation
would be a decline of k67 billion.This figure is cer-
tainly too high.A lower figure results if the change
in proportions, which is shown in Figure 2 and
which corresponds to an absolute amount of k13
billion, is interpreted as the return flow of
D-marks from eastern Europe and if we further
assume that this return flow is limited to the
German currency. Assuming again a symmetrical
black-money effect in all other euro-11 countries
yields a total effect in the amount of k48 billion
for the part of the euro-11 money supply which
could have returned from eastern Europe, Turkey
and black money coffers to the central banks of the
euro-11 countries in the four years from 1997 to
2000.
This amount is only a rough and indirect esti-
mate.11After all,part of the decline may have been
due to the introduction of electronic payment
transactions. Furthermore, the share of notes and
coins which may be considered black money could
have been higher in the other euro-11 countries
than in Germany.12 And finally, the total does not
include, as mentioned, the other euro currencies
which are also returning from eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, as the German decline in money bal-
ances against the trend is k27 billion, a euro-11-
total of about k50 billion does not seem im-
plausible.
Some have argued that the effect described by us,
while being theoretically possible, is much too
small to be able to explain a noticeable part of the
actual exchange-rate movements. After all, they
claim, that part of the money supply which is
involved is very small relative to the size of inter-
national capital flows and also relative to the total
stock of international assets. Indeed, k48 billion
are only 14% of the euro-11 monetary base, only
2.4% of M1 (currency in circulation plus demand
deposits), only 0.9% of M3 (currency in circula-
tion, demand deposits, time and savings deposits)
and an even smaller (by the tenth power) percent-
age of the total portfolio of assets including bonds,
shares, property, works of art, etc., not to mention
foreign exchange flows. The fact is clear, but noth-
ing can be deduced from its observation alone.
There are a number of reasons why the arguments
put forth are without substance and why a change
in money demand in the magnitude mentioned suf-
fices to explain a substantial part of the exchange
rate movements.
1) Stocks and Flows
A comparison of money stocks with trade flows
in foreign exchange markets makes no sense as
it compares apples with pears. Behind the k48
billion stands a multiple of annual transactions,
as each individual coin and banknote changes
hands several times. In Germany GDP amounts
to DM 3,972 billion and – after deducting the
D-marks held abroad according to Bundesbank
estimates – currency in circulation amounts to
about DM 180 billion. This corresponds to a
velocity of 22.Applied to the figure mentioned,
this yields a change in the volume of transac-
tions achieved abroad with the help of the
D-mark in the amount of at least DM 1,056 bil-
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10 In a multiple regression it is of course always possible to
improve the fit of the cyclical movement by including additional
variables like lagged values of the interest rate,GDP and exchange
rate and thereby lower the residuals. From an economic point of
view this would be a nonsensical procedure which would cloud the
special features of the past development rather than highlight
them.Time, the present interest rate and the present GDP are the
variables which – according to economic theory – explain the
demand for money, and perhaps also the present stocks of assets.
Past values of these variables do not belong in the equation. For
comparison,we did apply such a dynamic specification in the sense
of a error correction model (Sinn and Westermann 2001). A com-
parison of the accumulated residuals did not yield qualitatively dif-
ferent results from the above. (Frequently the mistake is made in
interpreting dynamic models to look at the simple instead of the
accumulated residuals.) 
11 We lack the data necessary for a more direct estimation.A pre-
liminary analysis of the situation in France, Italy and Spain con-
firms the reduction in the currency in circulation relative to the
trend which we found in Germany. In France which experienced a
short-run reduction in the velocity of money circulation during the
year 2000, the monetary base has fallen sharply in recent months.
In June 2001 its absolute value was again as low as in 1997 although
the economy had grown considerably in the meantime.
12 At least this follows from the analysis of Schneider and Ernste
(2000).CESifo Forum 39
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lion.Even this figure is too low because the true
transactions volume behind GDP (gross pro-
duction, which is unfortunately not measured
for the aggregate economy) is still bigger. Since
nobody knows the true velocity of money for
different uses, trying to explain exchange rates
with transaction flows makes no sense at all.
Macro theory learned this half a century ago
when it abandoned the Loanable Funds theory
and trade theory learned it a quarter century
ago from the Asset Approach.
2) Only Money Matters
In contrast to other models of this kind, the
portfolio-balance model formulated by us dif-
ferentiates between currency, bonds and shares
in the international wealth portfolio.13 It shows
that the exchange rate depends only on the
stock demand for money in the narrow sense,
i.e.M1 or M0,and not M3 or other aggregates of
interest-bearing assets. The demand for bonds
or shares cannot affect the exchange rate direct-
ly but at most indirectly via the demand for
money in the narrower sense of the word. By
itself the demand for such assets is irrelevant,
however big it might be. It explains asset prices
and interest rates, but not exchange rates. In
short: “Money matters!“ even if stocks are
small. The mere remark that money stocks are
small is an irrelevant statement of fact, but cer-
tainly no counter argument.
That only money in the form of M1 can play a
direct role is, by the way, not so much an impli-
cation of a specific model specification, but
almost an implication of sheer logic. The
exchange rate is not the rate of exchange
between any two profitable assets, but between
the currencies of different countries. For some
unknown reason, this seemingly trivial fact is
frequently overlooked.
In this connection it should be emphasised that
only M1 is concerned here and not the “money
supply“ M3 which is the focus of the European
Central Bank. Since M3 also includes time and
savings deposits which themselves are close sub-
stitutes for treasury bills which the Central
Bank uses in its open-market operations, it
hides much of the relevant effects resulting
from the return of the eastern-Europe curren-
cies or the fleeing black money.14
In order to keep interest rates constant, the
European Central Bank is forced to absorb part
of the returning currencies by selling treasury
bills.Vice versa,the central banks of other coun-
tries are forced to sell part of the demanded cur-
rencies for treasury bills and similar assets in
order to prevent the demand from raising inter-
est rates. When the exchange is completed,
fewer foreign treasury bills and more European
treasury bills will be in the hands of the public
which, in order to re-establish international
portfolio balance, requires a lower exchange
value of the euro. After such an action, fewer
time and savings deposits and more currency
will be available outside Europe whereas in
Europe it will be just the reverse, but the
“money stock“ M3 has neither changed here
nor there.
3) Central Bank Intervention would also be
Negligible
If the mentioned money stocks were really too
small to have noticeable exchange-rate effects,
this would have consequences not only for our
explanation. Any attempts of the European
Central Bank to support the exchange rate by
interventions would also be in vain. Although
the ECB does not make public the volume of
exchange-market intervention, inofficially men-
tion is always made of only few billions of euro.
If such intervention amounts are to be effective,
then a return flow of some k50 billion, as iden-
tified by us, will also be effective.
Indeed, an intervention in the foreign exchange
market at constant short-term interest rates, i.e.
sterilised by an adjustment of the money supply,
works via the same mechanism as the returning
eastern-European and black money. It changes
13 The portfolio approach permits only interest-bearing assets in
the broader sense, and the monetary approach ignores that inter-
est-bearing assets of different countries cannot be perfect substi-
tutes if only because of the exchange-rate risk. We know of no
other approach which combines the assumption of imperfect sub-
stitutability and the assumption that international investors hold
different currencies. Both assumptions are necessary, however, in
order to understand the complex effects of a change in the money
demand, the reactions of a central bank pursuing an interest-rate
target, and the exchange rate.
14 When the Bundesbank decided to change from M1 to M3 as the
money aggregate to be targeted because M1 was too volatile, it
might implicitly have reacted to the shift in the components of M3
caused by the Turkish and eastern European money demand.
Because of the unknown development of the foreign money
demand, money-supply targeting became inappropriate and was
replaced in fact by interest-rate targeting.the ratio of non-European and European trea-
sury bills in the international asset portfolio and
demands an exchange-rate adjustment in order
to re-establish portfolio balance in the financial
market. Despite sterilisation, exchange-market
intervention does have exchange-rate effects.
4) Three Quarters Can be Explained
The important question is, however, whether a
decline of the monetary base by about k50 bil-
lion can indeed cause effects large enough to be
of practical relevance. Answering this question
requires an empirical determination of the cor-
responding reaction coefficients. Recent contri-
butions by Evans and Lyons (1999 and 2001) on
the “micro structure of the exchange rate” con-
clude, on the basis of extensive empirical analy-
ses, that each billion of additional sterilised dol-
lar money demand raises the dollar exchange
rate by one half cent. If about the same figure
applies to the euro,then this means that our the-
ory explains the depreciation of the euro by
about 25 cents in the period 1979 to 2000.This is
about three quarters of the actual depreciation
which was 34 cents during this period.
The downward pressure on the euro will most
likely continue in 2001, although speculative
changes in expectations due to the attack on the
World Trade Center may help the euro. The
physical introduction of the euro in January and
February of next year will eliminate the down-
ward pressure. The euro will gradually become
popular in eastern Europe and it will probably
also find its way back to the black markets.The
fall of the Iron Curtain bolstered the D-mark in
the early 1990s, fear of its conversion into the
euro has weakened it after 1997 and with it the
euro itself.According to the same logic,a period
of strength could begin for the euro once the
conversion has occurred.
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